International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) - Hazen, Jennifer M.  - Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups - 2010

Gangs have long been considered a source of violence and insecurity, but they are increasingly identified as a cause of instability and a threat to the state. Yet gangs operate mainly in non-conflict settings, raising questions about whether applying a conflict lens to understand gangs is appropriate. Marked differences appear betweenarmed groups and gangs when considering concepts of ungoverned spaces, the state,  violence, and sustainability. Few gangs reach the threshold of posing a direct challenge to the state; this makes comparisons with other armed groups difficult and suggests the need for a more specific analytical lens.

Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) - Max P. Glaser - Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Actors: The Parameters of Negotiated Access - 2005

This paper addresses the question of humanitarian engagement with the nonstate armed groups that increasingly populate the zones in which humanitarian action takes place. In particular, it seeks to understand why some combatants react positively and consistently to humanitarian demands to meet access preconditions, while others respond erratically, decline to respond or are hostile.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) - Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou - The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda: Lessons in Post-September 11 Transnational Terrorism - 2011

As part of the Geneva Paper Research Series, Ould Mohamedou writes on the long standing impact of Al Qaeda on global politics. Ould Mohamedou details  Osama Bin Laden’s disappearance from Al Qaeda and the War on Terror scene as a mark to the end of the era of the original group set up in Afghanistan. It opens a new phase in which the regional franchises will enact further their existing independence and in so doing endow the conflict with a new configuration by stretching the centre of gravity of transnational terrorism.

Dragovic, Denis, Terrorism and the Aid Industry: A Back to Basics Plan, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, (Feinstein International Center, October, 2009).

A large and critical difference of opinion emerged between key actors in the American aid and anti-terrorism movements regarding whether or not poverty is the root cause of terrorism. Whether this divide resulted from political expediency, pop culture naivety, intellectual disconnect, or a combination of all three, America’s foreign aid policies remain stuck in limbo, continuing to be implemented using the same techniques of pre-9/11 poverty alleviation and then upsized in an effort to tackle terrorism.

The article discusses four key recommendations to transform US foreign assistance into a more effective tool in the fight against poverty and violent extremism.

Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (AIVD), From Dawa to Jihad - The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, 2004.

Studying the various threats emanating from radical Islam, including the terrorist threat, should do justice to the complexity of these phenomena with all their national and international aspects. For this reason, the AIVD is now applying a broad approach in its study of radical Islam in the Netherlands, looking at phenomena such as poor integration, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorism from a wider perspective.

Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalisation processes. These processes may manifest themselves in various ways and involve also other than terrorist threats (for example, interethnic tensions). For the AIVD combating terrorism starts by countering radicalisation processes. Preventing, isolating or curbing radicalisation are important means to combat terrorism with a long-lasting effect.

Simultaneously, traditional investigations into terrorist organisations and networks are continued unabatedly. But traditional counter-terrorism without a focus on radicalisation processes and prevention will prove to be less effective in the long run. In addition, the AIVD emphasises the importance of enhancing society's resistance capability and of the vital role of the Muslim minorities in this context. As concerns the threats emanating from radical Islam and radical Islam-related terrorism, we should firstly focus on the protection of the Dutch society and its vital infrastructure, and secondly on strengthening the relevant communities in the Netherlands, including Muslim communities.

 

 

Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (AIVD), Violent Jihad in the Netherands - Current trends in the islamist terrorist threat - 2011.

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the threat posed by Islamist terrorism has dominated the national and international security agenda. The AIVD has published several reports on various aspects of this threat. This paper should be read in the context of these earlier AIVD publications. It is an elaboration of the publication Dawa To Jihad , which came out in 2004, but focuses exclusively on violent jihadist  movements within radical Islam.

Violent Jihad in the Netherlands charts the phenomenon of Dutch-based jihadist  networks which represent the terrorist threat currently confronting us. The paper provides insight into the emergence of these networks and their development over the past few years. The most important trend observed by the AIVD is the fact that the jihadist threat is increasingly rooted in our own society. The principal causes are the processes of radicalisation and recruitment among young Muslims. In addition to peer pressure, the internet plays an increasingly important role.

In this paper the perception of Al-Qaeda as a strategic mastermind controlling jihadist networks and plotting attacks worldwide is put into perspective. It happens frequently that decentralised networks act on their own initiative, often spurred on by local circumstances. At present the most serious threat to the Netherlands appears to emanate from these local jihadist networks rooted in their own breeding ground.

National government bodies and local authorities should adapt their policies accordingly. The principles of a broad approach focused on failing integration, radicalism, recruitment and terrorism as interlinked elements of the aforementioned phenomenon - as set out in the paper principles for this policy. It has led to a broad, wide-ranging approach to counterterrorism in the Netherlands, in which various government bodies are involved. Their efforts focus on both measures to prevent radicalisation and on repression of terrorist networks and individuals. At national level, the National Co-ordinator for Counterterrorism plays an initiating and co-ordinating role with respect to these efforts. At local level, several major city councils have now begun to implement this broad approach.

 

Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow, James Putzel, Policy Arena, Introductory Article: On the Discourse of Terrorism Security and Development, in: Journal of International Development, Crisis States Research Centre and Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006.

 

This paper introduces the policy arena by examining the increasing interlinking  of  international development policy with security concerns, particularly at a discursive level in

the global North and especially since the declaration of the United States led ‘War on Terror’. The authors propose that it is not only the US that has altered its approach to development in  light of the new security agenda, but so too have some multilateral development organisations, along with bilateral donors that in the past have been associated with a less politicallydetermined programme of development cooperation. The incorporation of security concerns in development thinking is not new and dates back at least to the Cold War era. Although the security-development nexus can be construed positively, the linkage has taken on new forms and dynamics in the contemporary context. Increasingly, development is viewed by some actors as a means of addressing ‘looming threats’ emanating from the global South towards the North. The authors suggest that if security for the North becomes a central guiding principle for development in the South, this will be damaging for both the project of global poverty reduction and global security.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Dr Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, GCSP Policy Paper 15, May 2011.

Roland Marchal,  Warlordism and Terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? the case of  Somalia, In: Internatioinal Affairs Nr 83, pp. 1091-1106, June 2007.

Civil wars are dirty wars, and as they progress their complexity increases. To make sense of these confl icts, considerable knowledge and understanding of the political

background are needed. In addressing this challenge, donors, media commentators and academics continue to frame new concepts—or sometimes, more accurately,

new buzzwords: among those that have become prominent over the past decade are ‘complex emergencies’, ‘failed’ (nowadays ‘fragile’) states, ‘warlord’ and

‘terrorism’. To what extent have these catchphrases contributed to a deeper understanding of the situation and better policy responses? Do they tell us more about

western perceptions of civil conflicts than about the complex set of problems those conflicts generate?

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Audrey Kurth Cronin, When should we talk to Terrorists?, 2010.

This report explains the conditions under which governments might promisingly negotiate with terrorist groups so as to end their violence. Based on qualitative and quantitative research that explores the lessons of negotiations with terrorist groups and analyzes other potential pathways for a group’s decline, including decapitation, repression, reorientation, and implosion, the conclusions herein offer general guidance to policymakers who must decide whether to enter talks with a given terrorist group. The report applies those lessons specifically to the current debate over negotiating with “al-Qaeda” and “the Taliban.”

The Brookings Institution, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad, January 2011.

This book tries to look at Pakistan today and in the face of Pakistan’s importance. What I try to do in this book is look at the intersection of three separate issues or three separatenarratives and see how those three issues come together to produce the uniquely combustible Pakistan we face today.The first issue is Pakistan’s own domestic politics, the second is the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship, and the third is the growth and development of the global jihad movement.

Jamestown Foundation, Camille Tawil, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from Within Jihadist Circles, April 2010.

This paper will try to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses demonstrated by AQIM in the whole of the Maghreb during 2009 with particular comparison to the previous few years. In doing so, this paper will take into account the activities of AQIM in some – but not all – of the Saharan countries known as the Sahel region. This article will refer to AQIM’s activities in Mali, Niger and Chad, or the northern Sahel, a region seen as an integral part of the Southern Zone of AQIM, despite the fact that it lies geographically outside the traditional Arab Maghreb. I will conclude with an attempt to foresee what trends AQIM will assume over the course of this coming year.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Rick 'Ozzie' Nelson, Thomas Sanderson, A Threat Transformed - Al Qaeda & Associated Movements in 2011.  

AQAM has three basic tiers. Bin Laden and his close associates comprise al Qaeda core, the group responsible for 9/11 and now based in western Pakistan. Al Qaeda affiliates and like-minded groups is a broad category that includes al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al Shabaab, and several other regional terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda–inspired, nonaffiliated cells and individuals is a diffuse tier comprising radicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, but draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from, the core and affiliates. The transformation of the al Qaeda threat into a broader movement has important implications for U.S. and international counterterrorism strategy. First, the diffusion of global Islamist terrorism has greatly complicated the work of policymakers and national security practitioners. Al Qaeda core, while operationally diminished, plays an active role within the syndicate of armed groups active in Pakistan and Afghanistan, often helping to facilitate attacks that it alone could not perpetrate. Emerging affiliates pose a range of threats: In less than a year, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched two attempted attacks on the U.S. homeland; and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in perpetrating the 2008 Mumbai bombings, provoked further military tensions between Pakistan and India. Nonaffiliated cells and individuals, while mostly unsophisticated, represent a unique type of threat: “homegrown” extremists could enable domestic attacks. This report examines the nature of these changes and is part of a larger, year-long study that will forecast the nature of AQAM in 2025.

UN OCHA, Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2004.

It is hoped that this glossary serves as a practical reference guide to terms often used within humanitarian situations, and that it will be reviewed and updated periodically.

ICHRP (Internatinal Council onHuman Rights Policy), Minear Larry, Humanitarian Action in an Age of Terrorism - Working paper for conference on "September 2001: Impacts on Human Rights Work", 2002.

The International Expert Conference, “Security and Humanitarian Action: Who is Winning?”, comes at a propitious moment. Eight months-plus after September 11, the dramatic and lethal terrorist events in New York and Washington remain fresh in mind. At the same time, enough of an interlude has passed to establish their profound impacts on popular attitudes in the United States and abroad, on security and humanitarian policy, and on national budgets and legislation.

This background paper seeks to identify the major issues of policy and operations for humanitarian organizations both as a function of global terrorism and, no less important, in relation to responses in the form of anti-terrorism strategies. The analysis draws on a conference held three years ago at the White Oak Plantation in Yulee, Florida, sponsored by the Humanitarianism and War Project. While the reality of terrorism did not figure in the discussion then, the conference explored tensions during the first post-Cold War decade between North American and European perspectives,  between the delivery of emergency relief and the protection of basic human rights, and between practitioners and researchers. Today’s preoccupation with terrorism has confirmed and deepened some of the fissures identified three years ago.

Indian Defence Review, Fundamentals of Victory against terror Sri Lankan Example – The Eight Man Team, 2009.

Stepanova Ekaterina, Trends in armed conflits, in Stockholm Internatioinal Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

 

 

 

The diversity of violence reflects the range of motivations, identities and levels of activity of armed actors. Predatory groups that engage in criminal violence and exploit opportunities offered by a war economy continue to proliferate in conflict zones. Increasingly, states engaged in counter-insurgency are trying to mount symmetrical responses to asymmetrical challenges from non-state actors by relying on paramilitary groups, including ethnic, sectarian or tribal militias. The merging of insurgent, inter-communal, tribal and criminal violence with counter-insurgency operations can easily acquire crossborder or broader transnational dimensions.

Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer, The evolution of Al-Qaedaism - Ideology, Terrorists, and Appeal, December 2007. 

Given the extreme fluidity of ‘Al-Qaeda’, this study will not try to analyze the latest developments or to describe the Al-Qaeda of today. Instead we go back to basics and look at the different forms and phases of Al-Qaeda. In addition we investigate the persons and ideas behind it. With regard to the latter, our primary focus is not on the many post-‘9/11’ studies on Al-Qaeda, but on the documents and statements of Al-Qaeda itself.

National CounterTerrorism Center, 2008 Report on Terrorism, 2009.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with required statistical information. The statistical information included in this Annex to the 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism is drawn from the data that NCTC maintains on the www.nctc.gov website.

Section 2656f(b) of Title 22 of the USC requires the State Department to include in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." While NCTC keeps statistics on the annual number of incidents of "terrorism," its ability to track the specific groups responsible for each incident involving killings, kidnappings, and injuries is significantly limited by the availability of reliable open source information, particularly for events involving small numbers of casualties or occurring in remote regions of the world. Moreover, specific details about victims, damage, perpetrators, and other incident elements are frequently not fully reported in open source information.

 

National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism, April 2010.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with the statistical information. The State Department includes these information in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." NCTC keeps statistics on the annual number of incidents of "terrorism," but its ability to identify the specific group responsible for each incident resulting in death, injury or kidnapping is significantly limited by the availability of reliable open source information, particularly when attacks involve few casualties or occur in remote regions of the world. Moreover, specific details regarding victims, perpetrators, damage or other elements of the incident are frequently not fully addressed in open source reporting.

Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation: James Cockayne, Jason Ipe, and Alistair Millar, Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa,  September 2010.

Since 2001, the threat in the sub-region has evolved from a network of nationally based organizations focused on the overthrow of local regimes to an increasingly regionalized and externally oriented network of organizations, connecting local grievances to global procurement, recruiting, and financing networks.

 

This report provides an overview of the evolving threat in North Africa and analyzes how states in the sub-region working with external partners, including the United Nations, European Union (EU), and United States, can improve sub-regional counterterrorism-related cooperation. It builds on recommendations made at a November 2007 conference held by ISESCO, the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Tunisian government in Tunis on “Terrorism: Dimensions, Threats and Countermeasures.”

The Journal of International Security Affairs, Sageman Marc, The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism, Spring 2005, Number 8.

Social Europe Journal, Neumann Peter, Old and New Terrorism, August 2009, Vol.4 Issue 3, London.

Humanitarian Policy Group, Macrae Joanna, Harmer Adele, ODI-HPG Report 14, Humanitarian action and the ‘global war on terror’-a review of trends and issues, July 2003.

INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Center), Assessing the Implications of Counter-Terrorism Measures for NGOs, January 2006.

Although in some countries a great deal of NGO effort has been expended on compliance with Counter Terrorism measures law, there has been no comprehensive and deliberate effort to assess the indirect effect of CTM on NGO operations and decision making, How will CTMs debelop in the future and how can NGOs best respond? Should NGOs consider co-ordinated responses to CTMs to better inform governmental regulations and legislatures?  By convening the dialogue among Northern and Southern NGOs as described in this document, INTRAC seeks to assess and answer these questions and provide NGOs with better information with which to make decisions.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?, Policy Watch #1392: Special Forum Report (2008).

Rapporteur's summary of remarks on July 18, 2008, by Michael Braun, assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), at a special policy forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Braun spoke about the nexus between drugs and Middle East terrorist groups and the growing challenge this relationship poses to U.S. national security.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Levitt Matthew, Anti-Money Laundering - Blocking Terrorist Financing and its Impact on Lawful Charities, May 2010.

US Department of Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines for Charitable Sector, September 2006.

Treasury Updates: Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines for Charitable Sector

The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities (Guidelines), taking into consideration the comments and suggestions provided by the public to assist the charitable community in efforts to safeguard itself from the threat of abuse and exploitation by terrorist organizations.

ICRC, International Review, International Treaties against terrorism & the use of terrorism during armed conflict and by aremed forces, December 2006.

Europol, TE-SAT 2010 - EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2010.

The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) contains basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks, arrests and activities in the EU. The TE-SAT is based mainly on information contributed by EU Member States resulting from criminal investigations into terroristoffences. Terrorism and related phenomena in the EU are summarised in terms of both quantity and quality, and trends are identified for the period 2007 to 2009.

 

 

Intrac, Fowler Alan, Aid Architecture - Reflections on NGDO Futures and the Emergence of Counter-Terrorism, Occasional paper Series n°45, January 2005.

 

Non-governmental organisations involved in international development (NGDOs) face unprecedented conditions that call for thoughtful responses. Three major dynamics are combining to shape NGDOs’ policy and operating environments. First, in a relatively unstable and insecure world order, NGDOs must deal with demands generated by a comprehensive, interlocking architecture of international aid. This construction could homogenise NGDO thinking and practice along official lines and induce negative competition. It can also increase tensions between service delivery and governance roles. At the same time, the aid framework promotes more complex relationships that can help or hinder resourcing opportunities. All these possibilities have implications for NGDO effectiveness, accountability, identity and sustainability. A second set of pressures stem from developments within civil societies. Here, Southern NGDOs need to contemplate displacement by social movements as agents of structural change, while Northern NGDOs would do well to consider the growth of domestic, migration-driven diasporas as potentially more effective international civic resource providers, intermediaries and advocates. The uncertain, interactive effects of all these evolutionary factors are now compounded by the abrupt and still emerging impact of counter-terrorism measures (CTM) on civil liberties and human rights in general and on aid policy and practices in particular. The consequences of donor and NGDO compliance with CTM laws, policies, rules and procedures are likely to be unevenly distributed and potentially unchallengeable. CTM carries implications for change in NGDO behaviour and relationships, preliminary signs of which are identified. Responding to this new and complicated combination of circumstances will require well thought through strategies allied to insightful leadership and organisational agility. As a contribution to such processes, the paper unpacks and analyses key dimensions of contextual dynamics. The results are used to identify issues and critical questions that NGDOs could be asking about their futures and choices. The paper also indicates related topics for reflection by funders. To assist discussion, ideas about possible forward-looking options for NGDOs and donors are provided.

World Vision - Thompson Edwina, Principled pragmatism - NGO engagement with Armed Actors, 2008.

US Federal Emergency Management Agency,  Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against Builldings, December 2003.

InterAction, Handbook on Counter-Terrorism Measures - What U.S. Nonprofits and Grantmakers Need to Know, 2004.

ODI HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network) - Thorne Kristina: Terrorist Lists and Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 37, 2007.

Are the terrorist lists inhibiting humanitarian action? At the moment, the answer seems to be that the lists are a worry, rather than a deterrent. What comes through most strongly in conversations with agency and donor staff is the fear of not abiding by the law, and the frustration of not knowing what the legislation entails, or understanding its consequences. This fear and frustration is not just on the agency side. Civil servants in donor governments are also worried about not fulfilling all aspects of national law as they issue grants and contracts. This may not necessarily have an impact on the willingness or ability of donors to process agreements, but it does risk slowing the process down.

RedR UK: The global war on terror and its implications of security management, 2003.

RedR Seminar Report summarizing the proceedings of the 2003 event. The purpose of the seminar was to address the "challenging security issues in complex operating environemtns such as Afghanistan & Iraq...The seminar provided an opportunity to discuss the main challengs and constraints their organizations and staff are facing and to discuss the appropriateness of current security management theory and practice in managing risk within these contexts."

Geneva Call & PSIO (Program for the Study of International Organizations),  Women in Armed Opposition Groups speak on War, Protection & Obligations under IHL & HRL, Workshop report 8.2004

 

We know that the role of women as actors in armed conflict has traditionally been neglected and undervalued. Has their potential in the promotion of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHR) within armed opposition groups also been overlooked? Additionally, we recognize that in a number of ways women and girls experience and respond to armed conflict differently than men and boys. Would these differences make women within armed opposition groups potentially more receptive to supporting and promoting IHL and IHR? In seeking to learn more about the experiences of women and girls within armed opposition groups and to answer questions about their potential roles in promoting IHL and IHR, a unique workshop was held in August 2004, in Geneva, Switzerland, organized by Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organization(s) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. During the four day workshop, 32 women from 18 armed opposition groups met with a small group of peace and human rights activists, humanitarian actors, and scholars. The 32 women were members of armed opposition groups currently in armed conflict.

 

This report covers the key protection and obligations for women and girls in armed opposition groups under IHL and IHR.  It documents and analyzes the ways women experience empowerment in armed opposition groups, and the ways they are disempowered. The report then moves to cover key disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) issues raised by the women participants. It concludes with an investigation into the potential gains and obstacles facing women and girls within armed groups and those wishing to work with them in promoting and enforcing IHL and IHR within armed opposition groups. Each section is followed by key lessons learned from discussions with women in armed opposition groups.

Geneva Call & PSIO (Program for the Study of International Organizations),  An inclusive approach to Armed Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Norms, Report of the first meeting of signatories to Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment, 2004.

In March 2000, Geneva Call obtained the first signature of the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Co-operation in Mine Action (Deed of Commitment). Nearly five years on, more than 25 armed groups or non-State actors (NSAs) from Africa, the Middle East and Asia have followed suit and renounced the use of anti-personnel mines (AP mines) by signing the Deed of Commitment. In November 2004, as States were preparing to attend the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi, Geneva Call, in collaboration with the PSIO and the Armed Groups Project, convened a parallel meeting for non-State actors in Geneva. During the three-day event, representatives from signatory groups and prospective signatory groups, humanitarian actors, academics, diplomats and mine action practitioners had a unique opportunity to meet, exchange views and review Geneva Call’s work.

 

This report summarises the discussions that took place in plenary and during the working groups on each of the four topics on the agenda:

I. Implementing the Deed of Commitment

II. Monitoring and Promoting the Deed of Commitment

III. Expanding the Geneva Call Mechanism to Other Humanitarian Norms

IV. Mine Action and Peace Processes.

The most widely prevalent type of armed conflict today is non-international in nature. It involves hostilities between government armed forces and organized non-State armed groups or is carried on among members of such groups themselves. A major challenge has always been how to make the rules of IHL known to the opposing sides and how to ensure they are applied.

Small Arms Survey,  Small arms, armed violence and insecurity in Nigeria- the Niger Delta in Perspective.

HPCR (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University), Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, HPCR Occasional Paper Series, Winter 2006, Number 6.

The concept of ‘transnational armed groups’ has been used increasingly since September 11, 2001 by those who consider the ‘war on terror’ to be an armed conflict and who wish to apply the laws of armed conflict, called international humanitarian law (IHL), to that conflict (rather than human rights domestic

legislation and international law on cooperation in criminal matters). In this debate, it is often claimed that IHL, as it stands, is inadequate to cover such a conflict and such ‘transnational armed groups’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Geneva Call and the Program for the Study fo International Organisation(s) (PSIO), Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban, 2007.

Geneva Call has been engaging armed non-State actors (NSAs) in a landmine ban since 2000. The organization was created in response to the realization that the landmine problem could only be addressed effectively if NSAs, which represented an important part of the problem, were included in the solution. To facilitate such a process, Geneva Call has developed an innovative mechanism – the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (hereafter the “Deed of Commitment”) – which enables NSAs, who by definition cannot accede to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (hereafter the “Mine Ban Treaty”), to subscribe to its norms.

After seven years of hard work, Geneva Call has decided to review the operation and status of the Deed of Commitment, and to document the progress accomplished in a similar form to the Progress Reports that have been prepared by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty since 2005.

The purpose of this Geneva Call Progress Report, which builds upon recent self-assessment1 and research efforts carried out by Geneva Call, is to take stock of the action taken to date, to record the achievements and remaining challenges, and to highlight priority areas for future work.

 

Geneva Call and the Program for the Study fo International Organisation(s) (PSIO), Women in Armed Opposition Groups in Africa and the Promotion of IHL and Human Rights,  2005.

What role do women leaders within armed opposition groups play in promoting or violating international humanitarian law and human rights law during situations of armed conflict? Are there ways for national and international humanitarian and human rights actors to work more effectively and successfully with such women to promote these laws during armed conflict? In addition, during the tenuous periods of peace negotiations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and the emergence of new forms of power-sharing governments in the aftermath of conflict, what are the key human rights issues that arise for women associated with armed opposition groups? Finally, what are the ways for such women to work in conjunction with NGOs and civil society organizations to address some of the key issues of violence and inequality that propelled many of them to join the armed opposition in the first place? During November 2005, a workshop was held is Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to address these questions, learn more about the experiences of women and girls within armed opposition groups in Africa during and after armed conflict, and put forward recommendations regarding their potential roles in promoting international humanitarian law and human rights law in conflict and postconflict periods.

Geneva Call and the Program for the Study fo International Organisation(s) (PSIO), Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines - Towards a holistic Approach to Armed Non-state Actors.

 

Globally, humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly approaching not only the armed forces of States, but also those of non-State actors (NSAs) to try to reduce the abuses committed during armed conflict. By combining relevant literature with the findings from the analysis of NSA involvement in humanitarian mine action, the report suggests some factors and incentives that might influence the behavior of an NSA and its likelihood of committing itself to respect humanitarian norms, as well as factors that might influence the outcomes of such engagement.

 

This study is the third volume of a project that investigates the involvement of NSAs in the landmine problem, both in its negative (use of landmines) and positive (contribution to mine action) aspects. The report summarizes and analyzes the main findings of the project, and applies these findings to other related issues - child soldiers and small arms – as well as places the issue in the broader context of NSA engagement. It should be noted that humanitarian engagement does not affect the legal status of the NSA involved. In conclusion, the report argues for a holistic view of NSAs, hence considering both their capacity for destruction as parties to a conflict, but also their potential to contribute to the solution of human security problems. It has been demonstrated that it is possible to work with NSAs in humanitarian action, such as mine action, and that this has direct beneficial effects for the civilian population (reduction of humanitarian suffering and removal of obstacles to development). Notably, one important finding is that although many NSAs used landmines, their contribution to mine action activities was more extensive than expected. This potential could and should be used.

Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organisation(s) (PSIO), Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines - A global Report profiling NSAs and their use, acquisition, production, transfer and stockpiling of landmines, October 2005.

Although armed non-state actors (NSAs) have always existed, in the last twenty years the international community has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel (AP) landmines.

This report, which builds on an analysis published in 2004, maps the role of NSAs in the landmine problem (2003-2005). The report investigates and analyzes how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines through a presentation of individual group profiles. This report has recorded a global occurrence of AP and anti-vehicle mine planting by NSAs, whether activated by a victim, a vehicle or at a distance by command-detonation. Around 60 NSAs have deployed landmines in 24 countries in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Over 40 groups made use of some type of victim-activated devices. The mines employed were both factory-made and handmade, indicating both involvement in mine transfers and production.

One of the main findings of this report is that there is a need to discuss the mine issue not only with states, but also with NSAs. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the long-term perspective of the consequences of mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the international community to find channels of communication with NSAs on the AP mine issue. This report argues that only by understanding NSA and region specific dynamics is it possible to address the - current and future - landmine problem caused by NSAs.

Max P. Glaser, Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: The parameters of negotiated access (London: Humanitarian Practice Network, June 2005).

The paper’s ultimate objective is to determine the parameters of responsible humanitarian engagement with combatants. Glaser argues that ‘the proliferation of ANSAs has complicated humanitarian access because it has contributed to a deterioration in the security conditions for aid workers in conflict zones”. The direct aim of humanitarian engagement with ANSAs is thus to ensure security guarantees for aid workers; and to secure the ANSA’s respect for the rules of IHL. This paper discusses humanitarian engagement, and considers why some ANSAs react positively and consistently to humanitarian demands to meet access preconditions, while others respond erratically, decline to respond or are hostile. Glaser looks at the characteristics and classifications of ANSAs; means of engaging ANSAs and their effectiveness and reliability; and modalities of engagement, levels and interlocutors. He provides a methodology for assessing ANSAs to encourage analysis of the civil relations that underlie the process of negotiating access.

 

Manual Bessler and Gerard Mc Hugh, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups; A Manual for Practitioners (New York: UN OCHA January 2006).

The authors define humanitarian negotiations as those “undertaken by civilians engaged in managing, coordinating and providing humanitarian assistance an protection for the purposes of: (i) ensuring the provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations; (ii) preserving humanitarian space; and (iii) promoting better respect for international law. They provide guidance on humanitarian negotiations with non-State armed groups, and address motivations and partners; framing the negotiations; working toward more effective negotiations; negotiating on specific issues; and unintended or unanticipated consequences of negotiating.

 

 

Manual Bessler and Gerard Mc Hugh, Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (New York: UN OCHA January 2006).

These Guidelines accompany the Manual of the same name. They provide a structured approach to humanitarian negotiations with armed groups.